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Public Employee Bargaining: 
A Political Perspective 
Clyde W. Summerst 
Collective bargaining' in public employment is different from col- 
lective bargaining in private employment, for "government is not 
just another industry."2 This proposition I consider self-evident,3 for 
in private employment collective bargaining is a process of private 
decisionmaking shaped primarily by market forces, while in public 
employment it is a process of governmental decisionmaking shaped 
ultimately by political forces.4 The introduction of collective bar- 
gaining in the private sector restructures the labor market, while 
in the public sector it also restructures the political processes. 
However, it does not follow from the proposition that collective 
bargaining in the public and private sectors is different that col- 
t Garver Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. The term "collective bargaining" is used here to describe the process of establishing 
terms and conditions of employment in a written agreement negotiated between the 
public employer and a union acting as exclusive representative of the employees in 
the bargaining unit. This process is to be distinguished from "consulting" or "meeting 
and conferring," which lacks one or more of the basic elements of collective bargaining: 
exclusive representation, negotiation, and written agreement. The criterion is not the 
terminology used by the legislature or the courts, but the process used by the parties. 
Thus, although a Minnesota statute used the term "meet and confer," the process oc- 
curring under it was in fact collective bargaining. See Hetland v. Board of Educ., 295 
Minn. 338, 207 N.W.2d 731 (1973). On the other hand, an Arizona court used the term 
"collective bargaining" to describe a process which was bare consultation. See Board of 
Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ. Ass'n, 17 Ariz. App. 504, 509, 498 P.2d 578, 583 (1972), vacated 
on other grounds, 109 Ariz. 342, 509 P.2d 612 (1973). 
2. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIEs 202 (1971) [here- 
inafter cited as WELLINGTON & WINTER]. See Shaw & Clark, The Practical Differences 
Between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 867 (1972). 
3. Admittedly, there are many others who emphasize the similarities between public 
and private bargaining and who would solve problems in the public sector by anal- 
ogizing to the private sector. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT (1973); Edwards, The Emerging Duty To 
Bargain In The Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885 (1973); Kheel, Strikes and Public 
Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969). 
However, most of those who analogize to the private sector pattern generally acknowl- 
edge the need for some modifications, particularly with respect to the availability of 
the strike. See, e.g., Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment 
Labor Legislation: A Comparative An-alysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891, 909 (1969). 
4. See, e.g., Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics In Public Employment, 19 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 887, 1011-19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Project]; Goldstein, Book 
Review, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 603, 604 (1973). ("In terms of public education, collective 
bargaining must be viewed as a method of educational decision making, with teachers 
viewed as a group competing for educational decision-making powers with such other 
groups as administrators, school boards, community leaders, parents, students, legis- 
latures and, indeed, courts.") 
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lective bargaining in the public sector is inappropriate or that prac- 
tices in the private sector cannot be transplanted to the public sec- 
tor. Collective bargaining in both sectors is a process for determin- 
ing terms and conditions of employment and it might serve both 
the private and public decisionmaking processes equally well in 
similar, or even quite different, ways. What does follow from this 
proposition is that public sector bargaining must be examined as 
a part of the governmental process.5 The appropriateness of collec- 
tive bargaining practices in the public sector cannot be judged by 
analogies to the private sector but only by inquiries into how those 
practices fit within and affect the decisionmaking processes of gov- 
ernment. 
Proceeding from this premise, my purpose here is to try to analyze 
public employee bargaining from a political perspective, to focus 
on it as a part of the political process through which decisions con- 
cerning terms and conditions of employment for governmental em- 
ployees are made.6 The analysis is limited to collective bargaining in 
local governmental units, in part because that is where public em- 
ployee bargaining is most prevalent, but more importantly because 
its role in the governmental process at the state and federal level 
may be quite different and may require separate analysis. 
My hope is that the analysis presented here may enable us to see 
more clearly the special role of collective bargaining in public em- 
ployment and to evaluate more accurately its contributions and its 
dangers. The political perspective may also provide helpful guides 
in working out subsidiary problems in public employee bargaining, 
such as allocating authority to negotiate and conclude agreements on 
behalf of the public employer, determining the appropriate bar- 
gaining units, defining the subjects for bargaining, and prescribing 
the publicity to be given to the bargaining process. The last section 
of this article will attempt to project from the political perspec- 
tive some guides as to how we should deal with these problems. 
The political perspective may also sharpen our focus on the ap- 
propriateness of the strike and other methods of resolving bargain- 
ing impasses. Exploration of these problems, however, would re- 
5. See, e.g., R. HORTON, MUNICIPAL LABOR RELATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY: LESSONS 
OF THE LINDSAY-WAGNER YEARS 3 (1973); Cook, Public Employee Bargaining in New 
York City, 9 IND. REiL. 249, 267 (1970). ("Municipal labor relations is the political process 
by which the rules of the personnel system are determined.") 
6. For a quite different attempt to view public employee bargaining from a polit- 
ical perspective, see Love & Sulzner, Political Implications of Public Employee Bar- 
gaining, 11 IND. REL. 18 (1972). 
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quire extended analysis and factual inquiry beyond the limitations 
of this article. Our central concern here is how collective bargain- 
ing, as a method of decisionmaking, alters the governmental process. 
That change is structurally the same whether the strike is available 
or not as a pressure device within that process. Although a strike 
may affect the substantive outcome, it does not set aside the process. 
Because our concern here is with the process, our analysis is limited 
to the operation of collective bargaining itself, without resort to 
strikes. The impact of strikes can be better discussed separately, after 
the political perspective has been developed to provide a basic frame- 
work. 
Viewing public employee bargaining from the political perspec- 
tive gives no guarantee of simple or secure answers-quite the con- 
trary. Decisionmaking in government, even at the local level, is a 
highly complex process in which a variety of procedures, structures, 
and pressures interact in countless permutations to produce a de- 
cision. It is less principled than pragmatic, less an orderly system 
than a patchwork of processes. This is particularly true of budget- 
making and budget considerations dominate the form and substance 
of public sector bargaining in local government. 
Because of the complexity of the political process, the analysis 
here can be only tentative, a preliminary attempt to explain how 
collective bargaining can and does fit within that process. The 
accuracy of those explanations cannot be tested by logic, but only 
by empirical evidence of the operation of collective bargaining in 
the political process. Such empirical evidence, however, has not been 
systematically collected, largely because the relevant questions have 
not been asked. Many of the conclusions stated here can be little 
more than hypotheses supported as yet only by intuition, unsys- 
tematic information, and limited experience. My primary purpose is 
to present a framework which will better enable us to consider the 
problems of public employee bargaining, lead us to ask more of 
the right questions, and help us to identify empirical research 
needed to reach responsible conclusions. 
I. Basic Characteristics of Public Employment 
Before attempting to analyze how collective bargaining fits within 
the political process, it is essential to articulate certain basic char- 
acteristics of public employment and the process for deciding terms 
and conditions of employment. These characteristics are present 
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whether there is collective bargaining or not. All are obvious, but 
too easily overlooked. 
First, decisions as to terms and conditions of employment for 
public employees are governmental decisions made through the po- 
litical process. Market forces influence those decisions by determin- 
ing the availability of workers to fill public jobs, by affecting the 
value placed on public services by voters and their elected officials, 
and by altering the willingness or ability of taxpayers to pay for 
those services. But the influence of market forces is filtered through 
the political process, where they conjoin with noneconomic forces 
and considerations to produce a political decision. The decision is 
responsive not only to economic but also to political forces and 
this is true whether terms and conditions of employment are de- 
clared unilaterally by public officials or determined bilaterally by 
collective agreement. Although collective bargaining requires new 
structures and procedures and may lead to different substantive re- 
sults, the decisionmaking process nevertheless remains political. 
Second, in public employment the employer is the public-in 
ultimate political terms, the voters to whom the public officials are 
responsible. The voters, however, consist largely of two overlapping 
groups whose interests differ: first, those who use the employees' 
services and, second, those who pay for those services through taxes. 
The public employer, when seen not as an abstraction but as a 
collectivity of individuals, is made up of purchasers and users of 
the employees' services. Members of the public, as purchasers and 
users, are motivated by economic considerations; they want to maxi- 
mize services and minimize costs. The public employees' interest in 
lighter work load and higher wages conflicts with their employers' 
interest in more service and lower taxes.7 As in private employment, 
the economic interests of the employer and his employees are ad- 
verse. This opposition of economic interests between the public 
employer and public employee is present regardless of whether there 
is collective bargaining. 
Third, the voters who share the employers' economic interests 
far outnumber those who share the employees' economic interest. 
Almost every voter uses, in one way or another, the services of 
7. The public employee, if he is a resident of the local governmental unit, is also 
a taxpayer and a user of public services. However, his gain in higher wages or reduced 
work load presumably so outweighs his costs in increased taxes and reduced services 
that his voting behavior as an employee will be little influenced by his opposing 
interests as a taxpayer and a user. 
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public employees and almost every voter also pays for those services 
through taxes, directly or indirectly. Public employees of a govern- 
mental unit and their families make up only a small proportion 
of the voting population in that governmental unit-substantially less 
than 10 percent. At the local level some public employees are not 
residents and cannot vote in the governmental unit by which they 
are employed. This does not mean that public employees are po- 
litically helpless, but it does mean that, to the extent people vote 
their pocketbooks, public employees are at a significant disadvan- 
tage when their terms and conditions of employment are decided 
through a process responsive to majority will. 
Fourth, public employees, even without collective bargaining, can 
and normally do participate in determining the terms and conditions 
of employment. Many can vote and all can support candidates,8 or- 
ganize pressure groups, and present arguments in the public forum. 
Because their terms and conditions of employment are decided 
through the political process, they have the right as citizens to par- 
ticipate in those decisions which affect their employment. Such a 
right is not enjoyed by employees in the private sector. That par- 
ticipation can be meaningful and effective in obtaining better wages, 
shorter hours, and many other benefits, as the experience of many 
public employee organizations demonstrates.9 In part, this is be- 
cause people do not always vote their pocketbooks; appeals to fair- 
ness or altruism can influence political decisionmaking.10 
From these four characteristics of public employment there emerges 
more clearly the central significance of public employee bargaining. In- 
troduction of collective bargaining into the public sector alters the 
governmental process, creating within that process special procedures 
for making decisions about the wages and working conditions the 
public will give its employees. This is, of course, no argument 
against public employee bargaining, unless there is some predispo- 
sition against innovations in government. There is no immediately 
evident reason for assuming that customary or preexisting processes 
8. Subject to limitations on partisan political activities imposed by "little Hatch 
Acts" in some states. See Project, supra note 4, at 934-46. 
9. See id. at 927-29, 931-33. 
10. In St. Louis, the voters in a referendum approved by a 64.7 percent majority a 
firemen's pay increase which would give them parity with the police. In Los Angeles, 
the voters approved increased retirement benefits for policemen and firemen. This 
"lobbying with the people" by referendum and direct appeal to voters whose economic 
interests are adverse is one of the most common of all political actions pursued by 
public employees. See S. SPERO & J. CAPOZZOLA, THE URBAN COMMUNITY AND ITS 
UNIONIZED BUREAUCRACY 102-03 (1973); Project, supra note 4, at 930-33. 
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are best, or even adequate, when the decision to be made by the 
public is the special one of how much the public will pay its 
servants. On the contrary, the fact that the economic interests of 
the voting public, both as taxpayers and as users of public services, 
run directly counter to the economic interests of public employees 
in wages and working conditions suggests that public employees may 
need special procedures to insure that their interests receive adequate 
consideration in the political process." 
Clear recognition that public employee bargaining alters the po- 
litical process helps us frame what I believe is the central question: 
How can the political process best be structured for determining the 
terms and conditions of public employment? The issue is not whether 
bargaining in the public sector is like bargaining in the private 
sector, or whether the practices of private sector bargaining can be 
transplanted to the public sector, but rather what practices in the 
public sector will improve the political process. 
I do not mean to suggest that our experience with private bar- 
gaining is irrelevant. That experience gives us some understanding 
of the dynamics of the bargaining process and some guide as to how 
the parties will behave, for many of those actively involved, both 
on the union and employer sides, view the process from the per- 
spective of the private sector and carry with them into the public 
sector the patterns of conduct learned in the private sector.12 At 
the same time, our experience has shown us the nearly infinite varia- 
tions collective bargaining may take in adapting to special settings 
and should remind us that bargaining must likewise be adapted to 
the special setting of the public sector. We may indeed find among 
the many variants of collective bargaining suggestive solutions to 
special problems. But however relevant this private sector experience 
may be, the central question remains: How can the political process 
best be structured for mediating the adverse interests of the voting 
public and its employees? Collective bargaining should be evaluated 
in terms of its impact on and contribution to that political process. 
I1. For a discussion concluding that the public's failure to be even fundamentally 
fair with its employees has caused numerous strikes, see Taylor, Public Employment: 
Strikes or Procedures, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 617, 628-29 (1967). 
12. Many of the unions representing public employees are primarily private sector 
unions which have undertaken representation in the public sector. See J. STIEBER, 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH, POLICY 3-6 (1973). Even all-public 
sector unions, such as the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, are heavily staffed by people drawn from private sector unions. See id. at 34-36. 
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II. Collective Bargaining and Budget-Making: A Simple Model and 
a Variation 
An analysis of how collective bargaining alters the political process 
should begin with an examination of the budget-making process, for 
this is where public employee bargaining has its primary impact. The 
union's major demands at the bargaining table in most negotiations 
are either for increased benefits or reduced work burdens. The 
public employer's response to those demands is in terms of their 
increased budget costs. Whatever accommodation is reached becomes 
binding on the budget.13 
A. General Wage Increase 
For the purpose of comparing budget-making with and without 
collective bargaining, we can begin with the relatively simple model 
in which a city decides how much of an across-the-board wage in- 
crease to grant its employees, treating those employees as a unified 
group. Although wages are only one term of employment, and em- 
ployees are seldom a completely unified group, this model provides 
a framework for analysis of other more complex situations. 
Budget-making for a city, behind its facade of rationality, is a 
complicated political bargaining process in which various interest 
groups seek to have larger shares of the budget allocated for particu- 
lar purposes.14 One group presses for more money for police pro- 
tection, while another presses for more money for education. One 
group complains that not enough has been allocated for snow re- 
moval, while another complains that not enough has been allocated 
for garbage removal. One group wants more money for playgrounds 
and another wants money for a public golf course. The share of 
the budget allocated as a consequence of the efforts of each group 
depends on its persuasiveness and its political bargaining power, both 
13. The fact that no money is available in the budget is no excuse for failure to 
honor the agreement. See Tate v. Antosh, 3 Pa. Cmwlth. 144, 281 A.2d 192 (1971). As 
a county court in Delaware said, the time for "trade offs" is "before and during 
bargaining, not after a solemn agreement has been made." Delaware v. Local 1276, 
AFSCME, BNA 1973 Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REi'. No. 485, at B-7 (Del. Ch. 1972). A 
judge in Wayne County, Michigan, sentenced the county commissioners to jail for 
refusing to pay wage increases negotiated the preceding year, see annotation in BNA 
1973 Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 485, at B-17. 
14. For a description of budgeting as a political process, see T. ANTON, rHE 
POLITICS OF STATE EXPENDITURES IN ILLINOIS (1966); A. MELTSNER, THE POLITICS OF CITY 
REVENUE (1971). Most descriptions of the budget process treat it as an essentially ad- 
ministrative function performed according to objective rules and standards. This facade 
serves the interests of administrators who want to maximize their control and also of 
politically responsible officials who want to insulate themselves from the competing 
demands. 
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with respect to politically responsible public officials and other in- 
terest groups. There is a second interrelated bargaining process con- 
cerning the size of the budget which pits those who want increased 
services against those who oppose higher taxes.15 However, many of 
those who seek larger allocations for particular purposes resist in- 
creases in the total budget, especially any increases beyond those 
necessary to pay for their own priorities. This sharpens the con- 
test among the interest groups for shares in a budget which is in- 
sufficient to meet all of their demands.'7 The budget is ultimately 
a political document summarizing a complex accommodation of these 
multiple competing and overlapping interest groups.'8 
Within this budget-making process public employees constitute 
one interest group. In the absence of collective bargaining they are 
customarily an organized group playing an active role in the process 
much the same as other interest groups. They issue public state- 
ments to win public support, appear at budget hearings to present 
their case, make informal presentations to public officials, and promise 
to give or withhold political support. They participate in the po- 
litical process as one among many interest groups. Their budget 
15. From the economists' viewpoint, the size of the budget should be determined 
by weighing the satisfaction of the last dollar of expenditture against the pain of 
the last dollar of taxes. The purposes for which the expenditures arc made should be 
determined by weighing the satisfaction of the last dollar spent for one purpose 
against the last dollar spent for another. See Martin. An Economic Criterion for 
State and City Budget Making, 24 PUB. AD. REV. 1, 3-4 (1964). 
The calculus of the political official is much the same, but satisfaction and pain 
are measured in terms of who is satisfied and who is pained and how this will affect 
the election returns. Bargaining and trade-offs lead to utility maximizing, but utility 
is measured by voter response. See Haefele, A Utility Theory of Representative Gov- 
ernment, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 350 (1971); McKean, Tle Unseen Hand in Government, 
55 AM. ECON. REV. 496 (1965). 
16. For a discussion of the tendency of voters to split their fiscal decisionmaking 
into two parts, one on spending and the other on taxes, with ail imperfect bridge 
between the two, see J. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 88-98 (1967). 
In terms of pressure group activity, a single individual adds to the weight of both 
groups and exerts pressure twice, once on behalf of more services and once against 
higher taxes. Both of these pressures run against employees whose demand for higher 
wages threatens to reduce services or increase taxes, or both. 
17. This description of the political process in making taxing and expenditure de- 
cisions is highly simplified, ignoring a number of variables which affect the ultimate 
decisions. See J. BUCHANAN, supra note 16; R. MUSCRAVE, TIHE THFORY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCE 116-35 (1957). These variables, however, do not change the basic pattern of po- 
litical pressures described here, although consideration of them can give us a more 
complete understanding of how certain fiscal institutions and policies may aggravate 
or alleviate problems arising out of collective bargaining. 
18. The political accommodation function is obscured by incremental budgeting in 
which the starting point for each department is a fixed percentage increase over the 
preceding year. However, the preceding budget was an accommodation of the in- 
terests at that time and increases or decreases which deviate from the norm represent 
changes necessary to make a new accommodation of the competing interests at the 
time of the new budget. Part of that new accommodation will be corrections for mis- 
calculations made the preceding year as reflected in pressures felt in the interim. 
1163 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 09:25:05 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 1156, 1974 
share depends upon their ability to bargain in competition with 
the other interest groups. 
Collective bargaining significantly changes the role of public em- 
ployees in the budget-making process, providing them with a special 
procedure through which they can participate which is not available 
to other interest groups. The first crucial change is that, following 
the pattern of the private sector, the majority union becomes the 
exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit. It 
becomes the official spokesman, speaking with a single authoritative 
voice for all employees. Dissonance or indifference in the employee 
group is submerged, giving the employees' voice increased clarity 
and force. 
The second, and more crucial, change is that a responsible public 
official must bargain in good faith until either an agreement or im- 
passe is reached. This means that a public official representing the 
city must deal with the union face-to-face, and at length. Granting 
an interview, listening to a presentation, or even engaging in dis- 
cussion-the normal courtesy given by public officials to other in- 
terest groups-is not enough. When the union presents its demands, 
the public official or his representative must respond, not with 
evasive ambiguities or noncommital generalities, but with hard an- 
swers. He must give reasons, support them with facts, and expose 
his position to extended argument on each point. Ultimately, he 
may be required to submit the proposed budget to critical examina- 
tion, justifying the priorities implicit in its size and allocation. All 
of this must be done in a confrontation setting of face-to-face in- 
terchange. Thus, the bargaining table provides public employees with 
an official forum and a specially effective process for persuading 
public officials in budget-making. 
The third, and perhaps most important, change is that collective 
bargaining provides the union a closed two-sided process within 
what is otherwise an open multi-sided process. Other groups in- 
terested in the size or allocation of the budget are not present dur- 
ing negotiations and often are not even aware of the proposals being 
discussed. Their concerns are not articulated and their countervail- 
ing political pressures are not felt except by proxy through the city's 
representative at the bargaining table. If a tentative agreement must 
be approved by the legislative body, the other interest groups may 
then have their say, but an agreement reached at the bargaining 
table carries great weight in deciding both the size of the budget 
and its allocation. Further discussion and political efforts may be 
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largely ineffective in view of the presumption which runs against 
repudiation. 
Finally, once a collective agreement is concluded by whatever body 
has ultimate authority, its terms are binding for the duration of 
the agreement. Unlike terms established by ordinance or regulations, 
they cannot be reconsidered and changed without the consent of the 
union. For practical purposes the making of the agreement fore- 
closes further consideration until the time to negotiate a new agree- 
ment arrives. 
We must now confront the question whether the change worked 
by collective bargaining in the political process can be justified. Can 
we properly give public employees a special procedure that enables 
them to bargain separately from, and in some respects prior to, other 
interest groups in the budget-making process?19 Certainly giving one 
of several competing interest groups such a special status and role 
in governmental decisionmaking is not in the pattern of our "normal" 
political processes and might be considered inappropriate in a demo- 
cratic society.20 However, closer examination of the interplay of in- 
terest groups in budget-making reveals that the position of public 
employees in that process is quite different from that of other in- 
terest groups. Because of that difference collective bargaining may 
be an appropriate means of placing public employees on more nearly 
equal footing with other interest groups in the budget-making process. 
The special position of public employees, which provides the basis 
for their claim to a special procedure, has three major elements. 
First, payroll costs in most cities constitute 60 to 70 percent of the 
total operating budget.2' Any significant general wage increase leads 
almost inescapably to a budget increase. The employees, in lobbying 
19. The impact of collective bargaining in economic terms is difficult to measure. 
Several systematic statistical studies have been made to determine the effect of col- 
lective bargaining on teachers' salaries. While the studies show somen what different 
results, all agree that the effect of collective bargaining on salary levels is probably 
less than five percent. See Lipsky & Drotning, The Influentce of Teachers' Salaries in 
New York State, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 18, 34 (1973). One study of the effect of 
collective bargaining on salaries of firefighters concluded that in cities with union 
contracts the hourly wages are zero to nine percent higher and the hours are two 
to nine percent fewer. Ehrenberg, Municipal Govertnmtienit Structure, Unionization, and 
the Wages of Fire Fighters, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 36, 47 (1973). 
20. Other interest groups may, in fact, gain special access to governmental decision- 
making. For example, their representatives may be named to commissions which make 
decisions concerning their interests or their spokesmen may meet behind closed doors 
to persuade public officials by the weight of their arguments, the number of voters in 
the groups, or the size of their political contributions. For the purposes of the analysis 
here, this political reality is put to the side, for public employee bargaining ought 
to have a better justification than that it merely offsets other, questionable practices. 
21. See D. STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER LOCAL UNION PRESSURI 
120 (1972) [hereinafter cited as STANLEY]. 
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for increases, cannot persuasively argue that the necessary funds can 
be obtained by reductions in other expenditures, nor will they will- 
ingly argue that increased wage rates can be paid by reduction in 
the number of employees.22 They must, therefore, attempt to over- 
come opposition to an increased budget and this casts them in di- 
rect opposition to the taxpayers as an interest group.23 Moreover, 
among all of the interest groups seeking larger budget allocations, 
the employees are the most visible and the most susceptible to focused 
resistance. A modest percentage increase adds to the budget a mas- 
sive dollar amount-often the largest single increase in the entire 
budget-on which the taxpayer opposition can focus. No other in- 
crease can be so readily attacked with such great savings for the tax- 
payer. The only budget item of comparable magnitude is the allo- 
cation for education, but again salaries and fringe benefits account 
for 65 percent of school expenditures.21 Opposition to increases in 
the school budget focuses most strongly on increases in teachers' 
salaries since the other increases are made up of many small amounts, 
none of which alone has any substantial impact on the total budget. 
Second, in the political bargaining among competing interest 
groups seeking shares of the total budget, the employees are not 
simply one group among many bargaining on the same basis. On 
the contrary, the employees' demands run directly against the de- 
mands of each other interest group. Other interest groups are con- 
cerned ultimately, not with budget dollars, but with levels of service 
and they make budget demands in order to obtain a desired level 
of service. Voters urging increased appropriations for the police want 
more and better police protection; motorists urging larger alloca- 
tions for streets want better snow removal and fewer potholes; and 
parents pressing for larger school budgets want more teachers, smaller 
classes, and better facilities. But if the employees obtain higher salaries 
22. Negotiated increases, however, are in fact often followed by reductions in per- 
sonnel. In New York City, a 15 percent salary increase for policemen was accompanied 
by a 6,000-person reduction in the size of the force. See R. HORTON, supra note 5, 
at 110. But in Detroit, salary increases for police led to layoffs of 500 other employees. 
See STANLEY, supra note 21, at 79, 126. 
23. Taxpayer resistance to new taxes or higher rates of old taxes is much greater 
than resistance to continuation of existing taxes. See J. BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 
60-62. Except under unusual economic conditions, wage levels move upward so that 
the public employees will always be seeking increases and confronting the resistance to 
new taxes. 
Taxpayer resistance is often reinforced by state statutory or constitutional provisions 
fixing a maximum mill rate which local governments can levy on property and barring 
them from resorting to other sources for revenue. See Rehmus, Constraints on Local 
Government In Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REV. 919, 922 (1969). 
24. See, e.g., Simon, The School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining and Future 
Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409, 413 (1973). 
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and better fringe benefits, the budget dollars available will provide 
fewer police patrols, less snow removal and street repair, and fewer 
teachers in more crowded classrooms. Groups interested in the levels 
of different governmental services compete and bargain with each 
other for relative shares of the total budget, but employees must 
compete and bargain for a larger portion of each group's share. The 
employees' demand for a general wage increase is thus directly ad- 
verse to every other group's interest in the level of services.28 
Third, in the political process of budget-making public employees 
seeking general increases have few natural allies and only limited 
ability to form coalitions. The budget cost of a general wage in- 
crease is normally too great, and the employees have too few votes, 
to make the employee group an attractive political partner to other 
interest groups. Several interest groups seeking improved services 
and willing to pay increased taxes may combine to overcome the 
opposition of other taxpayers to increased taxes. But such coalitions 
will seldom support a general wage increase, for it would greatly 
increase the budget cost and reduce the improvement in services 
which they seek. Many voters may be persuaded that higher teachers' 
salaries may buy better education for the same money and that 
higher policemen's salaries may provide more police protection, but 
few will be persuaded that a general increase for all public employees 
will buy more service for the budget dollar. The public employees' 
only natural ally is organized labor, which in some cities has con- 
siderable political influence. Even that support is often more official 
than effective when public employees make demands on the budget, 
for most union members are also taxpayers and have less than whole- 
hearted enthusiasm for higher taxes to pay higher wages to their own 
employees.26 
Because of these three elements, public employees are at a unique 
disadvantage in the complex political bargaining process of budget- 
25. Few voters are able to master the intricacies of a municipal budget sufficiently 
to identify the particular trade-offs being made. However, as taxpayers they are acutely 
aware of an increase in the total budget and will be able to place responsibility on a 
general wage increase. As users of particular services, voters are sensitive to the de- 
terioration of those services and, although they may not be able to trace where the 
money was spent, they will hold the chief executive and the legislature politically 
responsible for the result. 
26. See S. SPERO & J. CAPOZZOLA, supra note 10, at 36-37, 47-49. Spero and Capozzola 
describe the unyielding conduct of the pro-labor mayor of Detroit with respect to 
city employees and the indifference of private sector unions toward their publicly 
employed brethren. Public employee unions themselves are not always united, for 
there may be divisive ethnic differences, leadership power struggles, and competition 
between groups of employees for limited funds. See J. STIEBER, supra note 12, at 108-09. 
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making.27 They are not one interest group among many in multi- 
lateral bargaining, but rather stand alone confronting the combined 
opposition of all the other interest groups. They must contend with 
both those groups opposing increased taxes and those seeking in- 
creased services. Because labor costs make up such a large portion of 
the budget, the employees' claims are highly visible to the- other in- 
terest groups and thus vulnerable to their concerted attack. 
In the absence of collective bargaining, the budget-making process, 
I believe, leaves public employees unable to protect their interests 
adequately against those whose interests are opposed. Collective bar- 
gaining creates a structure which is responsive to the political reality 
and gives the employees a more effective voice in the political process. 
The union confronts across the bargaining table a public official 
who represents the summarized and consolidated interest of the 
groups opposing the employees' interest. That public official is forced 
to consider the employees' interests and negotiate the extent to which 
their claims will exert pressures for an increased budget or for de- 
creased services. Because the bargaining process gives the union a 
special opportunity to present evidence and argument and because 
bargaining requires the public official to give answers with reasons, 
the union is able to substitute, in some measure, rational discussion 
for political pressure. This special procedure, and the more effective 
voice it gives public employees in budget-making, seems an appro- 
priate and necessary modification of the political process. 
B. Salary Increase for Teachers in an Independent School District 
The preceding analysis was based on a simple model in which 
all of the employees of a city acted as a single group to obtain a 
general increase. One variation of this simple model is the inde- 
pendent school district with its elected school board and its own 
taxing authority. Its political process for deciding on a salary in- 
crease for teachers is much like that of a city deciding on a general 
wage increase. However, there are illuminating differences. In such 
27. Public employees are undoubtedly more effective politically than their bare 
numbers reflect. Their interest is direct and substantial, leading to a more certain 
political response and to more intense political activity. Moreover, because they are 
familiar with the internal workings of government, they may be able to focus their 
political pressure more effectively. On the other hand, they may be subject to legal 
restraints on political activities by little Hatch Acts and other restrictions on lobbying 
activities. See Project, supra note 4, at 934-46. There are also practical restraints on 
their supporting one candidate over another, for if the union candidate loses, the 
union must confront a political enemy. Support of a losing candidate has been charac- 
terized by a union leader as "shooting yourself out of the saddle." Id. at 949. 
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a school district the direct users of the service-the parents-make 
up a major block of voters. They have a substantial interest in the 
quality of the schools and that interest is not diluted by competing 
interests in other governmental services. Although the parents may 
well be taxpayers who will help pay for increased school expendi- 
tures, they pay only a portion of the taxes, the rest being paid 
by nonparents, businesses, and industries.28 For parents, increased 
taxes for better schools are almost certain to be a good bargain. 
Although increases in teachers' salaries reduce the money available 
for other improvements, parents can support salary increases and 
still obtain more than their tax money's worth.9 Support for in- 
creased school expenditures, however, is not limited to parents, for 
there are others whose altruism or social responsibility encourages 
them to support "better schools." Indeed, members of this group 
may feel that support for a larger budget discharges this respon- 
sibility even though the additional money is used to raise salaries 
rather than the level of services. The result is that neither parents 
nor others who support increased school expenditures may see the 
demands of teachers for higher salaries as directly antagonistic to 
their interests. 
Such tempering of opposition to salary increases can be traced to 
the fact that salaries for a single governmental function are being 
decided in isolation. Parents who are also taxpayers would be less 
tolerant of increases for teachers if equivalent increases had to be 
paid to all other city employees. Few supporters of better schools 
have equal enthusiasm for increased expenditures on all other gov- 
ernmental functions. Both parents and other school supporters will 
thus normally oppose general increases for all city employees while 
urging increased school expenditures. 
The advantage enjoyed by employees in a single purpose district 
may be more than offset by the untempered opposition of those 
taxpayers who find little actual or psychic value for themselves in 
school expenditures and who therefore count the entire district tax 
28. Voter resistance to salary increases for teachers has been more precisely de- 
scribed as consisting of a spectrum of decreasing support and increasing resistance 
along the following line: voters who have children in public schools, voters who look 
forward to having children in public school, voters who have no potential students, 
and voters who have children in private and parochial schools. Goldstein, supra note 
4, at 605. 
29. See Whitelaw, The City, City Hall and Municipal Budgets, in FINANCING THE 
METROPOLIS 219 (J. Crecine ed. 1970). This tax-benefit leverage is almost always sub- 
stantial. Even in a predominantly residential suburb, the property owned by parents 
of school children will usually constitute less than half the total taxable property. 
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as a loss. If this group is politically dominant, then budget con- 
straints will press parents to oppose higher salaries as an alternative 
to reducing the number of teachers or failing to replace old equip- 
ment. 
Collective bargaining in a single purpose district takes on special 
characteristics because in such a district budget-making tends to be- 
come a direct political confrontation between two opposing interest 
groups: those who want to spend and those who do not want to 
pay for the particular governmental service. If the latter "taxpayer" 
group is politically dominant, then the employees must bargain with 
the users in dividing limited funds between salary levels and service 
levels. The process resembles that in which city employees seek a 
general wage increase. 
However, if the political strengths of the taxpayers and users are 
relatively equal, the employees may be able to join forces with the 
users and override taxpayer opposition to obtain both higher wages 
and better services. Collective bargaining then becomes less an ad- 
versary process than a means of implementing that alliance. The 
possibilities of such a coalition are increased in school budget-mak- 
ing, for what the teachers demand as increased benefits may be 
viewed by the parents as increased service. Many parents and other 
supporters of schools are receptive (or at least were in the days 
when there was a teacher shortage) to the argument that higher 
salaries are necessary to obtain better teachers. Similarly, teachers' 
demands for reduced work load in the form of smaller classes gain 
support from parents as an improvement in the quality of educa- 
tion. Because of this natural alliance between teachers and parents, 
collective bargaining for teachers may be unlike collective bar- 
gaining for other public employees, particularly where school dis- 
tricts have independent budget-making and taxing authority. 
C. Two Assumptions 
All of the preceding analysis, both of the basic city model and 
the special district variation, is built on two assumptions which are 
not always entirely true. The first assumption is that decisions as 
to general wage levels are an integral part of the budget-making 
process so that demands for wage increases are considered in terms 
of budget cost and ultimate tax impact at the same time as demands 
for increased personnel, supplies and equipment, and added services. 
However, authority to determine wage levels is often exercised by 
those who are not responsible for budget decisions. There is then 
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no direct confrontation between the competing claims of employees 
on the one hand and taxpayers and users of public services on the 
other. In some cities, personnel departments or civil service com- 
missions establish wage rates, using some "scientific" formula or 
"comparable" wage rates in other cities or in the private sector, 
without any overt consideration of budget consequences. The issue 
is framed as one between the employees and the personnel depart- 
ment, with taxpayers and users of public services excluded as parties 
in interest.30 Such a decisionmaking process, which is largely in- 
sulated from the pressures of taxpayers and users of public services, 
may work tolerably well when employees are unorganized but may 
fail in the face of collective bargaining.31 The personnel department 
may be able to resist the pressures of unorganized employees but 
be unable or unwilling to resist the increased pressures generated 
by collective bargaining when it is insulated from the counterpres- 
sures of competing interest groups.32 
A similar disjunction between authority and political responsi- 
bility occurs in a more visible form when school boards which do 
not have independent taxing power are authorized to make -binding 
collective agreements. If the school board can negotiate increases 
and require the city council to find the money, the school board 
may lack the necessary incentive to resist the added pressures gen- 
erated by collective bargaining. 
The second assumption is that most voters are taxpayers and there- 
fore have reason to oppose increased wages which result in increased 
taxes. This assumption has greatest validity when the principal source 
of revenue is the property tax and most voters are home owners. 
Any wage increase can be expressed in terms of mill rate increase, 
a sensitive political issue for every home owner. The validity of the 
assumption decreases, however, as the number of renters increases. 
Although property taxes are paid out of rent, few renters are sen- 
sitive to increases in mill rates and therefore may be indifferent to 
30. When wages are established on some supposedly objective basis, the debate 
focuses on the choice of the formula to be used or the wages to be considered com- 
parable. The nature of the debate obscures the fact that the choice of the formula 
or comparable wage is largely a political choice. As a result, the political interest 
groups appear to have no appropriate role to play. 
31. The union's pressure may be reinforced by the skill of its negotiators in de- 
veloping and manipulating the formula and the union's resources in gathering data 
to be used in making comparisons. The city's negotiator may be unable to counter 
the union's arguments, particularly if he must bargain with a number of different 
unions concerning many different kinds of jobs. 
32. For a vivid example of this in New York City, see R. HORTON, supra note 5, 
at 123. 
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or even support wage increases for which they must indirectly pay. 
The proportion of renters tends to increase with the size and den- 
sity of the city, resulting in reduced resistance to demands for wage 
increases. This tendency, however, may be partially offset as the city 
increases its reliance on sales and income taxes. These taxes are felt 
directly by nearly all voters, thus sensitizing them to the budget 
costs of wage demands.33 The impact of collective bargaining on 
the political process, therefore, will depend in part upon the size 
and density of the city and its tax structure. 
III. Collective Bargaining and Budget-Making: Fragmented and 
Complex Models 
The simple model developed in the preceding section treats all 
of the employees of the public employer as members of a single 
unified interest group seeking increased benefits for all and treats 
the employer's decision as a single response in terms of the total 
budget. In reality, however, such solidarity among the employees is 
rare and decisionmaking by the public employer is often fragmented. 
Policemen, firemen, teachers, and many other employee groups cus- 
tomarily have separate organizations, each pursuing its own goals 
for its own constituency.34 Decisions as to wages are often made by 
department heads and incorporated into departmental budgets, each 
department pursuing its own goals with varying degrees of central 
coordination of wage policies.5 Fragmented employee representation 
and employer decisionmaking may exist whether there is collective 
bargaining or not. 
The purpose of this section is to examine more closely how this 
fragmentation affects the political process through which terms and 
conditions of employment are determined. More specifically, this 
section will try to set out in simplified form, first, the politics of 
the budget-making process when separate employee groups seek wage 
increases for themselves, both with and without collective bargaining; 
and, second, how uncoordinated employer responses to those de- 
mands affect this process. 
33. For examples of voter resistance to wage increases reflected in increases in local 
income tax, see STANLEY, supra note 21, at 125-29. However, the sensitivity is probably 
not as great as in localities in which most revenue is generated by the property tax, 
for the cost of wage increases cannot be translated so directly into increased income 
tax rates. Moreover, a one cent increase in the sales tax or a one percent increase 
in the income tax rate may not have the same concreteness and provoke the same 
political reaction as a $100 increase in property tax bills. 
34. See R. HORTON, supra note 5, at 7, 63-64. 
35. See id. at 12. 
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A. Fragmentation of Employee Representation 
In the absence of collective bargaining a well organized, politically 
effective employee group may be able to protect its interests in a 
fragmented budget-making process quite adequately. The police, for 
example, may join with those seeking better police protection to 
obtain a larger share for the police department. Although their in- 
terests are potentially in competition with each other because higher 
salaries may mean fewer patrolmen, their combined political strength 
may be enough to obtain increases in both salaries and service. Tax- 
payer opposition to this particular increase is minimal because it 
has little or no discernible effect on the total budget on which the 
taxpayer focuses his attention. However, because of the taxpayers' 
opposition to an increase in the total budget, the police department's 
larger share may be achieved at the expense of other interest groups, 
including employee groups, which are less effective politically. One 
consequence is a disparity in benefits gained by the police as com- 
pared to those gained by other employee groups with less political 
effectiveness. 
Other employee groups, such as firemen, teachers, sanitationmen 
or social workers, may, of course, play this game simultaneously, each 
obtaining a larger share at the expense of politically weak groups. 
The success of each employee group will depend upon its relative 
political strength, including its ability to join with client voter groups. 
The differences in political strength will be reflected in disparities 
in budget increases and in salaries. As the number of employee groups 
playing this game increases, gains made by one group help trigger 
demands by the others, with substantial and visible budget conse- 
quences.36 This, in turn, tends to coalesce taxpayers and users of 
other services in their opposition to increases given to any par- 
ticular employee group. The disparities between employee groups 
may thus be reduced, but so long as there are differences in political 
effectiveness, there are almost certain to be differences in results. 
If some employees bargain collectively and others do not, those 
who bargain gain an advantage over the others because it increases 
their political effectiveness. As pointed out in the preceding section, 
formal bargaining provides employees an official forum and a struc- 
tured procedure which is a part of the budget-making process. Agree- 
ments reached through this procedure carry presumptive, if not con- 
clusive, weight in the ultimate political accommodation and any 
36. See STANLEY, supra note 21, at 67-71. 
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budgetary limitations will be felt first by those who have only in- 
formal procedures to reach informal understandings. If the em- 
ployee groups bargaining collectively are those which are most ef- 
fective even without bargaining, as is often the case, then the dis- 
parities between their gains and the gains of other employee groups 
will be accentuated. 
If all, or most, of the employees bargain collectively, though in 
separate bargaining units, and if bargaining decisions are centralized 
or coordinated on the employer side, the bargaining process will 
create pressures for uniformity and thus tend to reduce disparities. 
All of the employee groups which bargain collectively have access 
to the same procedures with equal opportunity to persuade the em- 
ployer's representative and to reach agreements which will carry 
presumptive weight in the budget process. Collective bargaining 
procedures most assist those groups which are least able to exert 
significant influence in the normal political process; they thus tend 
to equalize the political effectiveness of employee groups. In addi- 
tion, the different groups are often negotiating concurrently with 
the same representatives of the public employer. The high visibility 
of settlements creates almost compelling pressures on the employer's 
representatives to treat all groups with an even hand, regardless of 
differences in their political strength. The claim for equal treat- 
ment carries, in itself, considerable political weight and is difficult 
to deny in face-to-face negotiations. The structured bargaining process 
thus strengthens the position of groups which are otherwise politi- 
cally weak. 
This pressure for uniform treatment may create a bargaining 
process closely akin to that of the simple model described earlier, 
for the representatives of the public employer, in bargaining with 
one group, will project the cost of the proposed wage increase when 
granted to all groups and measure the impact of that general increase 
on the total budget. In practice, the agreement with one major or 
leading group will become the pattern for all other groups and 
negotiation with the other groups will be deferred or dawdled until 
the pattern agreement is reached.37 The political and budget-making 
process is thus substantially the same as if the pattern-setting group 
and the public employer were bargaining for a general increase for 
37. Earlier agreements may be reached with other groups on the understanding 
that these groups will be afforded increases in wages and other benefits equivalent to 
those negotiated by the pattern-setting group. The agreements may remain informal 
until the pattern is set, but in some cases the agreement may be formalized with a 
parity clause included. 
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all employees. This does not mean that all groups will necessarily 
be given identical benefits: It means only that the differences must 
be perceived as fair and not based solely on differences in political 
power. 
B. Fragmentation of Employer Authority 
Fragmentation of authority on the public employer side signifi- 
cantly changes the relative weight and interplay of interest groups 
in the decisionmaking process. A typical instance of such fragmen- 
tation is a municipality in which department heads are allowed to 
determine wage levels in their departments. A department head 
normally shares his employees' views that they are rendering service 
of first importance, that they are working hard, and that they need 
and deserve more pay.38 Often the department head has held lower- 
level positions in the department or, like a police chief or a school 
superintendent, considers himself a part of the same professional group 
as the employees under his supervision and shares their feeling that 
the profession is undervalued and underpaid. These tendencies are 
reinforced by his daily contacts with department employees, his 
desire to retain their loyalty and cooperation, and his role as their 
advocate in the interdepartmental budget competition. His respon- 
siveness to their interests may be further solidified if his salary in- 
creases tend to follow their wage increases.39 
At the same time, the department head feels little or no direct 
pressure from taxpayers and he discounts or ignores the demand for 
services rendered by other departments. In the budget process he 
seeks as much as possible for his department in order to satisfy the 
demands of his employees and the users of his services. Restraint is 
exercised by those who must accommodate the competing demands 
of taxpayers and the users of various services. This restraint is gen- 
erally imposed in the form of a departmental budget ceiling. In the 
face of an upper limit on expenditures the department head must 
accommodate the competing demands of his employees and those 
using the services of his department, for he can pay higher wages 
only by reducing the number of employees or some other service 
component. 
Some departments may be quite susceptible to pressure by users, 
38. See R. HORTON, supra note 5, at 13. 
39. Some school boards establish a policy of tying the salaries of the superintendent 
and the administrative staff to the salary scale of the teachers. The superintendent 
may nevertheless serve as one of the leaders of the employer negotiating team. 
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for any deterioration in services may be highly visible and sharply 
felt; other departments may feel almost no such pressure because 
the decrease in service is scarcely identifiable. A reduction in gar- 
bage collections will generate immediate pressure; a reduction in 
police patrols will create less acute but nonetheless tangible pressure; 
but reductions in the number of librarians or clerks in the tax office 
may be noticed only by other librarians and other clerks. Even where 
user pressure is strongest, however, it may be inadequate to overcome 
the department head's predisposition toward supporting the demands 
of his employees. User protests may be no match for the employees' 
daily personal contact with the department head. 
Collective bargaining greatly increases the employees' advantage 
when the employer's authority is fragmented. A union, confronting 
a department head across the bargaining table, is in the strongest 
possible position. Bargaining narrows the department head's focus 
to the interests of the employees, with which he tends to sympathize. 
No users or other interest groups are present to remind him of com- 
peting claims. His arguments in response to the union's wage de- 
mands are likely to be half-hearted, for he realizes that he relies on 
the cooperation and goodwill of union members. He regards any 
concession made to the union as adding only an insignificant fraction 
to the total budget. In fact, he may view an agreement with the 
union providing for higher wages as reinforcing his own request for 
an increased departmental budget. Even though a ceiling has been 
placed on his budget, the agreement for higher wages may give him 
enough leverage to break through the ceiling or to obtain a sup- 
plemental appropriation. Rejection of his budget request will not 
necessarily invalidate the agreement but will probably result in re- 
ducing the number of employees and the level of service. If the 
users of the service complain, the department head can place the 
blame on the lack of funds appropriated for his department. 
When bargaining is unified on the public employer's side and 
bargaining decisions are made by a politically responsible represen- 
tative, that representative is the focal point for all of the interests 
opposing the employees' demands. Collective bargaining may give 
employees a specially effective means of access to the political process, 
but this advantage is offset to some degree because the union is 
compelled to bargain against a consolidation of opposing interests. 
By contrast, when bargaining is fragmented and department heads 
make the bargaining decision, the opposing interests are not fully 
represented at the bargaining table. When any agreement is reached, 
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the city incurs a moral, if not legal, obligation to live up to its 
terms. As each department joins in this game, competing with every 
other department to obtain more, the upward pressure on the total 
budget and the downward pressure on the level of services becomes 
nearly irresistible. Political responsibility becomes obscured because 
restraints do not directly impinge on the officials negotiating the 
agreement and the city appears helpless before the demands of its 
employees. 
IV. Subjects of Bargaining: Variations on the Theme 
The preceding analyses have been limited to describing the political 
process when determinations of wage levels are involved. But em- 
ployees are concerned with more than their paychecks and the city 
is concerned with more than its monthly payroll. Indeed, public 
employee unions seek to bargain about an even wider range of sub- 
jects than those covered by collective agreements in the private sector. 
Police may seek to bargain about the number of men in a patrol 
car, the number of men on a shift, and the establishment of a public 
review board; teachers may seek to bargain about the number of 
classes to be taught, the number of students in the class, and the 
content of the curriculum; and social workers may seek to bargain 
about case load, the qualifications for welfare benefits, and the 
amount of those benefits. 
In the determination of wage levels or wage increases, the po- 
litical process centrally involved is budget-making, which creates a 
special alignment of political forces contesting the size and allocation 
of current expenditures. Other terms and conditions of employment 
involve other alignments of political forces and the impact of col- 
lective bargaining on the interplay of those forces may be quite dif- 
ferent. The purpose of this section is to examine some of the varia- 
tions in the political process when other subjects of bargaining are 
involved. The categories of subjects discussed are not intended to 
be comprehensive, nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive, but 
they suggest the degree to which political configurations may vary 
depending on the subject of bargaining. 
A. Indirect Wage Payments 
This category includes employer payments for such benefits as 
hospital and medical insurance, group life insurance, fully funded 
pensions, meal allowances, and uniform allowances. They are simply 
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other forms of wages which require current expenditures by the public 
employer and which therefore have the same dollar impact on the cur- 
rent budget as direct wages. The political forces will respond to 
increases in these categories in substantially the same manner as to 
increases in direct wages, at least so far as taxpayers and users of 
public services are involved. 
On the employee side, however, the pressures may be somewhat 
different. In one round of bargaining different groups of employees 
may press for different benefits-the police for increased pensions, 
office employees for more medical insurance, and truck drivers for 
more life insurance. If each is successful in obtaining the various 
benefits, in the next round each group is likely to demand the par- 
ticular benefits the others enjoy, the claim for equal treatment add- 
ing extra weight to those demands. Thus, many cities which have 
given special pension benefits to policemen and firemen have dis- 
covered that they have thereby strengthened the claim of other em- 
ployees to more costly pension plans. 
B. Deferred Wage Costs 
Negotiation of benefits which impose no burden on the current 
budget but defer costs to future budgets significantly changes the po- 
litical pressures felt at the bargaining table. Granting pension bene- 
fits without a current budgetary charge equal to the annual cost of 
funding those benefits provides an instructive example. Failure to 
fund the pension does not decrease its value to employees, for that 
value is measured by the size and certainty of the pension payment 
on retirement. Whether the city sets aside money from the current 
budget to pay for accumulating pension liabilities or pays from fu- 
ture budgets as employees retire makes little difference to the em- 
ployees. The city must pay in any case when the pension is due. 
However, failure to fund greatly decreases the opposition of tax- 
payers and users of city services to the pension provision, for the 
full cost is not reflected in the current budget and is not immediately 
felt in increased taxes or decreased services. The full cost is not felt 
until years later when those who agreed to the pension are normally 
no longer present to be held politically responsible. Deferral of costs 
has the effect of satisfying employee demands while tranquilizing 
those political forces which oppose increased wages. Under the pres- 
sures generated in collective bargaining the city's representative faces 
a nearly irresistible temptation to reduce the union's wage demands 
by agreeing to increased pension benefits. If the pension plan is not 
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funded these benefits create no immediate budget pressures but they 
bind future budgets to heavy burdens. 
The deferred pension costs will, of course, ultimately appear ill 
the budget and will at that time increase the resistance to wage in- 
creases. However, the "equal treatment" principle will then work in 
favor of the union's demands for take-home pay in line with the 
prevailing pattern of current increases. The total increase in wage 
costs over time will thus tend to be greater than if the pension costs 
had not been deferred but rather subjected to the full weight of 
taxpayer and user opposition. 
Deferral of costs to later budgets may also be accomplished by 
long-term collective contracts. Such deferral will have much the same 
political effect as a postponement of pension costs. The opposition 
to increased wages will be gauged primarily by the increased budget 
cost during the first year. A three-year contract with a small increase 
in the first year and a large increase in the third year will be more 
acceptable politically than a contract which provides for equal in- 
creases each year. Taxpayers and users of services respond more 
strongly to current tax increases and current deterioration of services 
than to future taxes and future services. In the year following ex- 
piration of the long-term contract, opposition to another round of 
increases may result from the previous year's budget rise. But again 
opposition will be mitigated by the "equal treatment" principle 
which works in favor of demands for a wage increase in line with 
that year's prevailing pattern. 
C. Reduction in the Level of Service 
Shorter work weeks, longer vacations, or additional holidays mean 
that each employee renders less service. This diminution can be, and in 
the long run often is, offset by an increase in the number of employees, 
which of course necessitates a budget increase. Such terms of em- 
ployment can thus be seen as simple counterparts of wage increases. 
However, when reduced work load terms are negotiated, the parties 
seldom contemplate asking for an increase in the budget to hire 
more employees; the tacit assumption is that, at least in the short 
run, services will be reduced. 
Because taxpayers react more immediately and vigorously to in- 
creases in current taxes than to reduction in the services those taxes 
will buy, they generate less opposition to union demands for reduced 
work loads than to increased wages. Opposition comes mainly from 
the users of the public services and its strength varies with the serv- 
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ice involved. Closing city offices for one day may cause comment, but 
reducing garbage collections may change the outcome of an election. 
Although gradual deterioration of service may at first generate 
limited political response, the fall-off can produce the kind of gen- 
eralized dissatisfaction which leads to political change when it becomes 
substantial and widespread. The growing demands for restoration or 
improvement of services will at that point exert added pressures on 
future negotiations to retard further wage increases or further re- 
ductions in work load. Thus, in the long run, the political pressures 
on these terms of employment probably work substantially the same 
as, or interchangeably with, those for wage increases. 
In one respect, however, pressures in the bargaining process work 
differently on some of these terms than on wage rates. Significant 
differences between the work week, vacations, and holidays enjoyed 
by public employees and those enjoyed by employees in the private 
sector are relatively easy to perceive. In the political process such 
visible comparisons generate pressures of their own. They strengthen 
the employees' demands when their benefits are below the private 
sector standard and weaken their demands when the benefits sought 
are above the standard. Comparisons of wage rates, however, are 
much more difficult since wage disparities may be attributable in 
part to real or supposed differences in jobs. Wage comparisons can- 
not therefore exert the same degree of pressure as more obvious and 
unambiguous comparisons. 
D. Increase in the Level of Service 
Some employee demands for reduced work load may increase rather 
than decrease the service level. For teachers, reduction in class size 
means easier and more enjoyable teaching; for parents, it means an 
improvement in the quality of education. As a result, teachers and 
the parents will join to press for smaller classes. Similarly, demands 
by policemen for minimum manning of shifts and demands by so- 
cial workers to limit their case loads will be supported by those who 
seek more police protection and more individualized social services. 
As a result, employees, in pressing for such terms, are able to build 
an alliance with the interest group seeking an increase in the level 
of the particular service. 
This alliance between a group of employees and users of the par- 
ticular service changes the configuration of political forces, but it 
does not necessarily shift the political balance. Still solidly arrayed 
against the alliance are all of those opposing an increased budget, 
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those interest groups more concerned with other services, and even 
other groups of employees. Reduction in class size may be supported 
by teachers and parents, but it will be opposed by taxpayers and 
motorists, as well as by policemen and public works employees be- 
cause the added cost of smaller classes reduces the funds available 
for wage increases for them. 
However, if bargaining is not unified or centrally controlled on 
the public employer's side, negotiation of terms which both reduce 
the employees' work load and improve the quality of service may 
preempt the exercise of any meaningful political restraints. In ne- 
gotiations on class size the school board feels the combined pressure 
of teachers and parents and is itself normally predisposed toward 
improving the quality of education. If the school board is not re- 
sponsible for raising the required revenue, it is insulated from coun- 
tervailing pressure. However, once the agreement is reached between 
the school board and the union, there is a nearly inescapable com- 
mitment to a certain level of expenditure. Unlike the higher costs 
which result from agreements to boost wages or other benefits, the 
increased costs for reduced class size cannot be offset by reducing 
the number of employees.40 Although the city council may have 
legal authority to disapprove the school board's budget, it will often 
be unable to do so without upsetting the collective agreement and 
without suffering the ensuing legal and political consequences. The 
end result is that the question whether the increased level of service 
is worth the increased cost does not get fully exposed to the political 
process until after it has been largely foreclosed by a collective agree- 
ment which is made between nonadverse interests. 
E. Determination of Goals and Methods 
Not all potential subjects of bargaining involve budgetary con- 
siderations. Professional employees, in particular, may want to par- 
ticipate in determining the goals to be achieved by the agency and 
the methods to be used in achieving those goals.4' 
When teachers seek greater control over choice of textbooks or 
student discipline policies, budget costs and levels of service are not in 
question; the only issues are the purposes of the school and the means 
40. Some of the cost may be offset by cutting back on "frills" such as art, music, 
and foreign language instruction; purchase of expensive equipment may be cut out; 
maintenance or repair of buildings may be deferred. This, however, may provide 
relatively insignificant savings, compared with the salary costs. 
41. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 2, at 137-41. 
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of their accomplishment. Similarly, when teachers seek curriculum 
changes or support for certain extra-curricular activities, there may 
be cost implications, but the dominant issue is one of educational 
goals and the worthwhileness of what is being proposed as against 
what is being done. Such demands present a totally different po- 
litical configuration than demands for increased salaries or smaller 
class size, for they raise no resistance from taxpayers as a group or 
from others who seek a larger share of the budget for other pur- 
poses. The only interest groups directly concerned-and they may be 
deeply concerned-are the parents and the students. Furthermore, 
their interests are not necessarily opposed to those of the teachers. 
Unlike the situation in which wages or other benefits with budget 
costs are sought, there is no combination of interest groups oppos- 
ing the teachers' demands. The imbalance of political pressures, which 
is the underlying justification for collective bargaining as a method 
of giving employees special access to the political process, is not present. 
In addition, disputes over the goals and methods of a public agency 
may create interest groups which cut across the interest groups con- 
cerned with budget costs. Some parents may favor strict student dis- 
cipline, some may favor lenience and toleration, and some may favor 
leaving wide discretion in the individual teacher. Similarly, parents 
may disagree as to what subjects in the curriculum should be em- 
phasized or what extra-curricular activities should be supported. The 
interest groups shift from issue to issue, each issue presenting a po- 
tentially different alignment. 
Teachers, too, often disagree among themselves on such issues, 
sometimes with diametrically opposed and strongly held views. Though 
the union may speak for the majority, it is less likely to represent a 
consensus when making demands on such issues than when making 
demands for increased benefits or decreased work loads. 
Collective bargaining on such subjects enables the union to speak 
with a single voice as representative of those holding opposing views 
and gives the union increased political effectiveness when it is con- 
fronted not by a coalition but by a fragmented opposition. More 
important, the union does not bargain with the representative of 
those holding an opposing view on "goal" issues; it bargains with 
the representative of those who seek lower taxes and more services. 
The government representative is thus under pressure to accept the 
union's demands on nonbudget items in return for union concessions 
which will keep down the cost of the agreement. 
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F. Personnel Practices and Administration 
Seniority rules, protection against discharge, work schedules, griev- 
ance procedures, and many other customary subjects for bargaining 
have no significant impact on the budget and do not impinge on 
the goals of the agency. Rather they serve primarily to govern the 
relations between the employees and their superiors. Neither tax- 
payers nor users of public services exert any direct pressure on spe- 
cific terms in this category; they exert only a diffuse pressure to 
get more and better service for their tax dollars. Resistance to the 
union's demands comes primarily from within the government it- 
self. Agency and department heads will resist encroachments on their 
managerial authority in the name of better and more efficient serv- 
ice to the public. 
The primary opposing interest groups are thus the public em- 
ployees on the one side and the public managers on the other. The 
generalized pressure of taxpayers and users normally strengthens the 
management position. In negotiations, the competing claims are be- 
tween efficiency and fairness, discretion and equal treatment, flex- 
ibility and regulation by established rule. Private sector experience 
has demonstrated that these issues are best worked out by face-to-face 
discussions between unions and management across the bargaining 
table. 
V. Some Implications of the Political Perspective 
This analysis has treated employee bargaining as a part of the 
political process. Obviously it has important implications for how 
bargaining should be structured and conducted in order to make it 
fit appropriately within that process. Some of those implications be- 
gan to emerge in the preceding discussion, but they need to be made 
explicit and their complexities elaborated. Other implications need 
at least to be identified. Again, the purpose is not to be comprehen- 
sive but only suggestive, to explore preliminarily where this per- 
spective of public employee bargaining might lead. 
A. Integration of Bargaining and Budget-Making 
The most obvious implication of this political analysis of public 
employee bargaining is that collective bargaining on terms which 
substantially affect budget allocations and levels of service must be 
integrated with the budget-making process. To achieve such inte- 
gration collective bargaining policies and decisions must be centrally 
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coordinated and controlled.42 The effective power to formulate these 
policies and render decisions must be merged in the public official 
or body which is politically responsible for the budget. 
All employees of a public employer are paid from a common 
budget funded by the same tax system. Increases granted to one group 
of employees trigger demands by other groups. Those subsequent 
demands are difficult to resist because claims of equity and fairness 
carry substantial weight in the political process, particularly when 
brought to bear through collective bargaining. Because of the co- 
erciveness of such comparisons, diffused authority to bargain and 
bind the public employer makes the budget vulnerable to the cost 
of a city-wide increase equal to that agreed upon by the most weak- 
willed or generous department head.43 Control over bargaining must 
be sufficiently centralized to ensure that a decision affecting one em- 
ployee group takes into account the effect it will have on other 
employee groups and the cost impact on the total budget: This ul- 
timate cost must be calculated in terms of tax rates and levels of service. 
Because payroll costs make up 60 to 70 percent of a typical mu- 
nicipality's current budget,44 the impact on taxes and service levels 
is likely to be significant. Before an agreement is reached the de- 
mands of the employees must be weighed against the opposition of 
taxpayers to increased taxes and demands of users for improved serv- 
ices. This accommodation of competing interest groups is, by its 
very nature, a political compromise which must be made by some 
individual who is politically responsible to all of the competing 
interest groups. 
Centralization of bargaining authority is much easier to advocate 
than to achieve in practice, for budget-making authority in cities is 
often widely diffused, various departments and agencies possessing a 
substantial measure of budgetary autonomy. As employees organize 
department by department, the simplest and least disruptive response 
is to authorize each department head to bargain with the union rep- 
resenting his employees. The bargaining system develops as frag- 
mented as the budget-making system on which it is based. Once this 
fragmentation has occurred, centralizing control over bargaining may 
42. See id. at 117-36. The authors emphasize the importance to public employers 
of restructuring internal allocations of power and centralizing the bulk of authority 
in order to meet the pressures of collective bargaining. 
43. For illustrations of the dangers which arise when local government fails to 
achieve centralized control of bargaining and coordination of control over wages and 
budgets, see Burton, Local Government Bargaining And Management Structures, 11 
IND. REL. 123 (1972). 
44. See note 21 supra. 
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be nearly impossible because it would threaten too many established 
patterns and vested interests. Even spiraling wage agreements may 
not lead to the necessary governmental restructuring, for politicians 
may find it more expedient to blame the power of unions than the 
weakness of fragmented government.45 Centralization can be en- 
couraged, if not compelled, however, by public employee bargaining 
statutes which expressly place the authority and responsibility for 
concluding collective agreements on the chief executive or the legis- 
lative body.46 
When authority is not fragmented along departmental lines, it still 
remains divided between the chief executive and the legislature: The 
executive lacks legal authority to enact a budget and the legislative 
body lacks practical ability to negotiate an agreement.47 This divi- 
sion of responsibility can create serious problems if the relative roles 
of the chief executive and the legislature are not clearly defined 
and if those roles are not the same in collective bargaining and 
budget-making. Coordinating the bargaining and budget-making roles 
of the two branches is not difficult conceptually. Just as the mayor 
prepares a proposed budget to be approved or disapproved by the 
council, so he may negotiate an agreement with the union subject 
to its approval by the council.48 
45. The devastating consequences in New York City of the failure to exercise cen- 
tralized control over collective bargaining and integrate it with budget-making is 
graphically described by Professor Horton: "Again, the problem in New York City is 
the absence of effective political management. . . There is no longer a strong man- 
agement group in New York City with whom municipal unions deal, only a potpourri 
of disparate public officials who play managerial roles without either managerial 
power or perspective." R. HORTON, supra note 5, at 119. 
46. The law frequently leaves unclear who has authority to bargain for the public 
employer. The courts have not always been helpful in resolving doubts in favor of a 
result which will centralize authority and integrate it with the budget process. In 
Civil Serv. Comm'rs v. Board of Supervisors, 384 Mich. 363, 184 N.W.2d 201 (1971), 
the court interpreted ambiguous statutory provisions as depriving the Wayne County 
Civil Service Commission of power to negotiate with highway employees although the 
Commission negotiated with other county employees; the court held that the authority 
to bargain was in the Wayne County Road Commission. 
47. The various roles which the chief executive and the legislature play in the 
collective bargaining process are described in WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 2, 
at 121-36. 
48. The Connecticut statute spells out their roles even more precisely. The chief 
executive is explicitly designated as the representative of the public employer in col- 
lective bargaining. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ? 7-474(a) (1958). If an agreement is reached 
with the union, it becomes binding unless it conflicts with a city charter or ordinance 
or requires funds in excess of those already appropriated. The legislative role is 
limited to approving or disapproving the necessary changes in the city charter or 
ordinances and the additional funds to implement the agreement. Id. ? 7-474(b). How- 
ever, the statute on its face appears to give the chief executive power to make a two 
or three-year agreement which will bind the legislature to appropriate the necessary 
funds in future years. This seems a rather surprising and potentially distorting realloca- 
tion of fiscal authority. 
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One danger of this division of authority is that a union which has 
failed to win a wage increase in bargaining with the mayor may 
try to induce the council to include it in the budget. Such "end 
runs" may be successful when only a few groups of employees are 
organized. When most of the employees are organized, however, 
legislators soon learn the folly of setting off a chain reaction which 
will escalate budget costs. 
A greater danger is that the chief executive will agree to a costly 
contract and attempt to shift to the legislature the onus of either 
rejecting the union's demands or approving increased taxes. This 
tends to frustrate the bargaining process because there is no estab- 
lished procedure for negotiations between the union and the legis- 
lature to work out compromises which should have been made at 
the bargaining table. It is doubtful, however, that such maneuvers 
seriously distort the political process, for both the chief executive 
and the legislature are politically responsible for the budget. If the 
costly contract is approved, both will be answerable to the taxpayers 
for any increased taxes and to users of public services for any de- 
terioration of those services. If the legislature rejects the costly con- 
tract, the chief executive will lose most of the good will he gained 
with the union and he will lose support among taxpayers. The visi- 
bility of the collective agreement and its budget consequences pre- 
vents either the chief executive or the legislature from escaping an- 
swerability for their roles. 
School districts which do not have independent taxing power raise 
special problems, for in such districts the school board negotiates 
the collective agreement but the city council provides the money. 
If, as is the case in some states,49 the city council is legally required 
to provide the money which the school board says is necessary to 
operate the schools, the pressures created by teacher bargaining may 
become unmanageable. Because increased school costs lose political 
visibility when they are incorporated into the general budget and 
the mill rate set by the city council, the school board is able to shift 
to the council much of the onus for increased taxes and deterioration 
of other services and thus escape full political answerability to the 
voters for the cost of its collective agreements. 
If, however, the city council is not legally required to provide the 
requested funds, it can determine the school budget in conjunction 
49. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, ? 34 (1971); Watt v. Chelmsford, 323 
Mass. 697, 84 N.E.2d 28 (1949). 
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with other departmental budgets and compel the school board to 
bargain within those limits or return to the council for additional 
funds. The council may thus upset an agreement negotiated by the 
school board. While such a risk tends to frustrate the bargaining 
process, it can be minimized by informal discussions between mem- 
bers of the school board and members of the council prior to making 
the agreement. Experience has suggested that even though bargaining 
responsibility and financial responsibility are separated, the bargain- 
ing process can function efficiently if the taxing authority retains 
the effective power to refuse the requested funds. 
Grants-in-aid from federal or state sources reduce the financial bur- 
den on the local government, but whether such grants disjoint the 
bargaining and budgeting functions depends upon the form of the 
grant. Fixed grants of less than the full cost of a department or serv- 
ice do not change the basic political process, for whatever additional 
sum the city decides to spend must be paid from the city's own 
budget. Employees' demands for increased wages will still be re- 
sisted by the taxpayers and users of public services.50 
Matching grants have a somewhat different impact. They encourage 
liberality in collective agreements as in other expenditures, because 
the gain to employees is double the cost to taxpayers. This phenomenon 
can have dangerous "equal treatment" radiations where one depart- 
ment receives large matching grants and there is no centralized con- 
trol over bargaining. Generosity in that department will trigger costly 
increases in other departments. 
Grants-in-aid which are appropriated at the state level in order 
to enable local officials to reach an agreement can result in a total 
evasion of local political pressures. In a number of instances disputes 
over teachers' salaries have been resolved by the state providing a 
supplemental grant to meet the costs of the agreement. Decision- 
making as to bargaining and budgeting is then split between local 
and state officials. The local officials who make the agreement es- 
cape the pressures of local taxpayers and users of local services; the 
state officials who provide the money are largely insulated by low 
visibility from pressures by state taxpayers.51 
50. Large new grants may reduce resistance to wage demands the first year because 
the city may be able to grant wage increases with no tax increases or reductions in 
service. In subsequent years, however, resistance to further wage increases will revive. 
51. A different form of "end run" occurs when public employees of local govern- 
mental units obtain state legislation mandating salaries, hours of work, or other terms 
of employment with budget consequences. The state legislators grant the benefits but 
the local officials must bear the consequences of budget decisions. 
Taxpayers may engage in analogous efforts, though in a less visible and more nar- 
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Integration of bargaining and budgeting does not require that bar- 
gaining be completed prior to adoption of the budget, however de- 
sirable that may be.52 The budget will normally contain funds to 
meet the estimated costs of a new collective *agreement and that 
estimate will represent a preliminary judgment as to the accommo- 
dation to be made between the competing interest groups.53 The 
funds may be visible in salary items, included in a contingency fund, 
or hidden in other budget items. If the salaries ultimately negotiated 
are higher than estimated, then the extra costs can be met by reducing 
the number of employees, cutting back other services, or making 
supplemental appropriations.54 The pressures at the bargaining table 
remain substantially the same as when the agreement precedes budget- 
making. In either situation the process of accommodation is similar 
and the authority and political responsibility rest in the chief execu- 
tive and legislature.55 
Placing central control over collective bargaining in the hands of 
a politically responsible official or body does not require that the 
mayor or members of the city council must polish the chairs at the 
bargaining table. It means only that those who are politically re- 
sponsible must establish the guidelines for bargaining, keep informed 
of the issues, and make the ultimate decisions. A mayor or council- 
man will seldom have the skill or experience, much less the time, to 
conduct the negotiations himself.50 However, the persons bearing ulti- 
mate political responsibility cannot properly isolate themselves en- 
tirely from the bargaining process. Bargaining in the public sector 
rowly focused form. State limitations on the power of local governments to levy taxes 
impose a ceiling on the level of expenditures and limit the normal operation of the 
local political process. Bargaining then becomes a confrontation between employees and 
users of public services, neither one of which can tolerably compromise enough to reach 
agreement, particularly in periods of rising prices and wages and increased expectations 
for public services. The consequences of this are vividly described in Rehmus, supra 
note 23. 
52. It may be practically impossible for the parties to reach an agreement and not 
even statutory requirements that bargaining be ended before the budget is submitted 
can compel agreement before a certain date. See SrANLEY, supra note 21, at 116-18. 
53. See Derber, Jennings, McAndrew & Wagner, Bargaining and Budget Making in 
Illinois Institutions, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 49, 56-57 (1973). 
54. If the city relies on the property tax for revenue, supplemental appropriations 
may require deficit financing, for the mill rate is politically difficult, or even legally 
impossible, to increase once it has been levied. 
55. The bargaining game may be modified with a side game of hide-and-seek as 
to the funds available in the budget for increases. In this game the public employer 
has the advantage, for its representative knows of funds about which the union can 
only guess. As a result the union usually refuses to play by insisting that the city 
can find the money if it wants to. 
56. See Mulcahy, Municipal Personnel Problems and Solutions, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 
529 (1973); Shaw & Clark, supra note 2, at 870-71. 
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is a part of the political process and one of its functions is to enable 
public employees to present their demands to a politically respon- 
sible official, make him feel the weight of their arguments and in- 
terests, and require him to give a reasoned response.57 This func- 
tion is frustrated if he sends someone else to the bargaining table 
to sit, listen, and reply in order to insulate himself from the pres- 
sure of the employees' presentation and avoid the necessity of re- 
sponse.58 
Whoever bargains for the government is his representative and 
must serve as a conduit rather than a barrier. The person with po- 
litical responsibility must feel the pressure of the employees' interests 
when he accommodates the competing interests of taxpayers and users 
of public services.59 
B. Number of Bargaining Units 
From the political perspective it might first appear that all em- 
ployees of a public employer should be united in a single bargain- 
ing unit.60 Closer examination, however, suggests that if there is 
57. Delegation of not only the negotiating function but its responsibility is some- 
times based on a desire to remove it from "politics" by "professionalizing" it. But, as 
Professor Horton has emphasized, "[M] unicipal labor relations is an inherently po- 
litical process. The allocation of public money and the fixing of public and mana- 
gerial policies, two major functions of the labor relations process, are central political 
acts in any organized society." R. HORTON, supra note 5, at 123. Speaking of New 
York City, which has followed this path, he says, "The key to reform is repoliticization." 
Id. at 124. 
58. One of the arguments used to justify delegating the negotiation function is that 
the negotiator can play one union against the other by confusing the rank and file 
about what concessions are possible and who has the authority to make them. The 
mayor himself, and his agency chiefs, can disown any direct knowledge or responsi- 
bility for the negotiators, making it difficult for any voter to conclude that he has 
been unreasonable in rejecting employee demands. See G. QUESTER, THE POLITICS OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 20 (Institute of Public Employment Monograph No. 
1, 1973). The negotiator has an incentive to reinforce this insulation, for he has a 
desire to move to the center of the stage and to demonstrate his indispensability. See 
id. at 16-17. 
59. Reliance on subordinates or professional negotiators to conduct the bargaining is 
an open invitation to the union to by-pass the negotiators by approaching directly the 
politically responsible official, particularly when the union believes the negotiator is 
serving as a barrier rather than a conduit. This may make discussions at the bargaining 
table of little use. Responsibility, however, rests not on the union for its effort to 
by-pass normal bargaining procedures, but on the public official for erecting the 
barrier. The union is simply trying to present its case to the politically responsible 
person-the central function of collective bargaining. 
60. Advantages and disadvantages of smaller or larger units are canvassed in Rock, 
The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 
67 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (1969). The author generally urges larger units rather than 
smaller units. This view has been incorporated into some state legislation. See Shaw 
& Clark, Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal 
and Practical Problems, 51 ORE. L. REV. 152, 154 (1971). Hawaii, by statute, provides 
for 13 statewide bargaining units for all state employees. HAWAII REV. STAT. ? 89-6 
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adequate centralized coordination of bargaining on the public em- 
ployer's side, then fragmentation of the employees into a number 
of bargaining units, each represented by its own union, creates no 
unmanageable problems. Indeed, multiple bargaining units may serve 
both the bargaining and budgeting problem better than a single unit 
represented by a single union.6' 
City employment spans an exceedingly wide range of skills, from 
the professionally trained engineer and health officer to the unskilled 
janitor and park attendant. The work and working conditions of 
city employees vary so greatly that their interests may be better rep- 
resented by separately chosen unions and their different problems 
may be better worked out in separate negotiations. A single union 
can, and commonly does, represent employees with varied and even 
competing interests. In fact, one function a union serves is to recon- 
cile and compromise those interests by its internal processes. How- 
ever, diverse interests within the union create internal tensions. If 
the diversity is too great the resulting tensions may be more than 
the union can manage. These tensions are then manifested at the 
bargaining table by the union making an array of demands de- 
signed to placate every group in the union. Bargaining becomes pro- 
tracted and if the union is unable to resolve differences by its in- 
ternal processes, it may be unable to work out compromises at the 
bargaining table or accept what might otherwise be considered a 
reasonable package. Thus, while multiple bargaining units add to 
the employer's negotiating burden, that cost may be less than nego- 
tiating with a conglomerate union which is trying to represent greater 
diversity than its internal processes can reconcile. Moreover, if bar- 
gaining reaches an impasse, the consequences will be less disruptive 
if only one group of employees is involved than if all employees are 
involved. 
Fragmentation on the employees' side obviously makes centralized 
coordination on the employer's side more necessary and more diffi- 
cult.62 If the fragmentation is too great, as in New York City where 
there are some 200 bargaining units, the process may be difficult 
(West Supp. 1972). The dominant statutory pattern, however, permits great fragmenta- 
tion of bargaining units. See Grodin & Hardin, Public Employee Bargaining in Oregon, 
51 ORE. L. REV. 7 (1971); Shaw & Clark, supra, at 154-59. 
61. For the way in which Detroit achieved central coordination of collective bar- 
gaining and integration with the budgeting process while negotiating 45 master agree- 
mnents and 30 supplemental agreements, see S. SPERO & J. CAPOZZOLA, supra note 10, 
at 45-50. Milwaukee, using quite a different structure in which the legislature has 
almost total control, bargains with 18 different unions. Id. at 57-62. 
62. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 2, at 98-102. 
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to control.63 But bargaining with a dozen, or even more, separate 
units ought not be beyond the capacity of a city government.64 
Confronted with multiple bargaining units, the public employer 
can exercise control over bargaining only by establishing some guide- 
lines, at least as to the size of the wage package, and limiting de- 
viations from that guideline. In practice, one negotiation and agree- 
ment will establish a pattern to which most other agreements will 
be required to conform, with only limited deviations.65 The pattern 
will control not only the wage package but also such work load terms 
as holidays, vacations, sick leave, and length of work week. Thus one 
union effectively bargains for the size of the wage package and com- 
mon work load terms. The other unions are limited largely to bar- 
gaining over how the available wage dollars are to be allocated among 
pensions, insurance, and take-home pay. Each union, however, retains 
the ability to bargain concerning the conditions that are unique or 
of special interest to the employees it represents. 
Pattern bargaining leads to practices which run counter to legal 
rules developed in the private sector as to what constitutes good 
faith bargaining, particularly when the pattern-setting agreement is 
not the first one negotiated. The public employer's refusal to settle 
with other unions until it has settled with the pattern-setting unit 
would be, according to traditional notions, bad faith bargaining.66 
When the employer makes offers to other unions, they will want 
assurances that, if the pattern settlement is more favorable, they 
will receive equal benefits. The pattern-setting union may then ob- 
ject that it is being required to bargain for employees not in the 
unit, contrary to traditional notions of good faith bargaining. 
Because public employee bargaining differs significantly from pri- 
63. New York City has so many agreements to negotiate that they are concluded 
at different times of the year. As a result, "it is virtually impossible to budget realis- 
tically for bargaining settlements. Bargaining and budgeting have become two very 
separate operations." STANLEY, supra note 21, at 117. 
64. A degree of fragmentation is nearly impossible to avoid but some cities arc 
able to hold it to a minimum. For example, excluding school employees, Philadelphia 
has only three units: policemen, firemen, and all others. See Rock, supra note 60, 
at 1007. Under normal circumstances, however, certain professional groups, such as 
doctors, nurses, social workers, and engineers, may make out compelling cases for 
separate representation: Division between blue collar and white collar employees may 
be difficult to deny. Schools will account for at least two additional units-teachers 
and others. As a result, a city of any size will be fortunate to have fewer than 10 
units, counting school employees. 
65. Agreements with policemen and firemen often follow a pattern which deviates 
substantially from the general pattern. Teachers have an almost wholly independent 
pattern, both in terms of percentage wage increases and other benefits. 
66. See U.M.W.A. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1965); AFL-CIO Joint Ne- 
gotiating Comm. for Phelps Dodge, 184 N.L.R.B. 106 (1970); F.W. Woolworth Co., 179 
N.L.R.B. 748 (1969). 
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vate bargaining, the legal rules from the private sector cannot be 
imported uncritically into the public sector. The principle of "equal 
treatment" virtually ensures that every visible increase granted one 
group will be translated into a general increase. Since the latter is 
the significant figure for budgetary purposes, some technique such 
as pattern bargaining must be devised to correlate an increase granted 
one group with its ultimate budgetary cost. Multiple bargaining units 
thus may require the public employer to establish and follow a pat- 
tern in bargaining. Pattern bargaining means, in effect, that one 
union will bargain for all those bound by the pattern. It- should 
not be considered bad faith for the parties to bargain in accord 
with these political and economic realities. 
If the pattern-setting union which bears the burden of bargaining 
or the unions which are bound by the pattern find the practice 
burdensome or oppressive, they can form a bargaining coalition to 
negotiate together those terms determined by the pattern and to 
bargain separately for those terms which fall outside the pattern.67 
Such two-level bargaining seems to serve the best interests of both the 
employees and the public employer, for it enhances integration of 
decisionmaking where necessary and permits diversity where desirable. 
C. Subjects for Bargaining 
Collective bargaining in the public sector, from the perspective 
of this inquiry, is a specially structured political process for making 
certain governmental decisions. The primary justification for this 
special process is that it gives the employees increased political ef- 
fectiveness to help balance the massed political resistance of tax- 
payers and users of public services. One consequence of public em- 
ployee bargaining is at least partial preclusion of public discussion 
of those subjects being bargained. And the effect of an agreement is 
to foreclose any change in matters agreed upon during the term of 
the agreement.68 Because it constitutes something of a derogation 
67. See Rock, supra note 60, at 1014-16. 
68. The question whether a collective agreement should prevail over a conflicting 
ordinance presents, at the first level, no difficult conceptual problem. Collective bar- 
gaining is a procedure for making government decisions; the collective agreement is 
a legal enactment. If a state statute prescribes that a city should follow certain procedures 
in regulating certain subjects, then the city cannot validly follow a different procedure. 
If the collective bargaining statute provides that, when a majority of employees has 
selected a representative, the city shall regulate certain subjects through bargaining, the 
city cannot supersede that procedure by the unilateral acts of the chief executive, the 
legislature, or even a referendum. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 41 
Mich. App. 723, 200 N.V.2d 722 (1972). The city can no more establish or change 
wages and hours without collective bargaining than it can enact a zoning ordinance 
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from traditional democratic principles, collective bargaining should 
be limited to those areas in which public employees do indeed en- 
counter massed resistance. In other areas, disputes by public em- 
ployees should be resolved through the customary channels of political 
decisionmaking. 
Borrowing concepts of bargainable subjects from the private sector 
can be misleading for two reasons. First, in the private sector col- 
lective bargaining is the only instrument through which employees 
can have any effective voice in determining the terms and conditions 
of employment. One purpose of the duty to bargain is to provide em- 
ployees a measure of industrial democracy; that duty, therefore, ap- 
propriately extends to all subjects which directly relate to their em- 
ployment. In the public sector employees already have, as citizens, 
a voice in decisionmaking through customary political channels. The 
purpose of collective bargaining is to give them, as employees, a 
larger voice than the ordinary citizen. Therefore, the duty to bar- 
gain should extend only to those decisions where that larger voice 
is appropriate. 
Second, in defining bargainable subjects in the private sector, the 
government is establishing boundaries for the dealings between pri- 
vate parties. In the public sector, however, government is establishing 
structures and procedures for making its own decisions. In the private 
sector the parties may agree at the bargaining table to expand the 
subjects of bargaining, but a public employee union and a public 
official do not have the same freedom to agree that certain decisions 
should be removed from the ordinary political processes and be de- 
cided by them in a special forum. The private employer's prerogatives 
are his to share as he sees fit, but the citizen's right to participate 
in governmental decisions cannot be bargained away by any public 
official.69 
without a public hearing and recommendation of the zoning board, where that is 
required by statute. Analytically, the question of what procedure the legislature con- 
templated should have dominance in regulating the particular subject matter. See 
generally Blair, State Legislative Control Over the Conditions of Public Employment: 
Defining the Scope of Collective Bargaining for State and Municipal Employees, 26 
VAND. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
69. A third difference, which is applicable in most public employee bargaining, 
is that the strike is not available to resolve disputes over bargainable subjects. In 
the private sector unions can strike to support demands on mandatory subjects, but 
cannot strike to support demands on nonmandatory subjects. See N.L.R.B. v. Wooster 
Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958). One of the considerations to be used in 
drawing the line between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects is the appropriateness 
of submitting the subject to the arbiter of economic force. In the public sector where 
the strike is prohibited entirely this consideration is absent. To the extent that strikes 
are legalized in the public sector, then the subjects for which the union can strike 
should be limited to those for which the use of the strike as a political pressure 
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In legal terms the principal question in the private sector is what 
the mandatory subjects of bargaining are, i.e., what decisions the 
employer must share with his employees. The principal question in 
the public sector is what the permissible subjects of bargaining are, 
i.e., what decisions may be made through the specially structured po- 
litical process.70 
The special political structure and procedure of collective bargain- 
ing is particularly appropriate for decisions where the employees' in- 
terests in increased wages and reduced work-load run counter to the 
combined interests of taxpayers and users of public services. There- 
fore, decisions as to wages, insurance, pensions, sick leave, length of 
work week, overtime pay, vacations, and holidays should be con- 
sidered proper subjects for bargaining.71 Collective bargaining, how- 
ever, lacks the same claim of appropriateness for decisions where 
budgetary or level of service considerations are not dominant and 
where the political alignment of taxpayers and users against em- 
ployees does not occur. 
For example, a decision concerning the content of the school cur- 
riculum does not centrally involve salary levels or work loads of 
teachers on the one hand, or the size of the budget or the level of 
service on the other. Rather, the decision requires a choice of the 
kinds of services to be provided within the limitations of the funds 
available.72 On such an issue there is no reason to assume that the 
device is appropriate. The union might, therefore, not be allowed to strike for some 
objectives for which it would be allowed to bargain without recourse to the strike. 
However, none of the statutes allowing public employees even a limited right to 
strike has drawn this distinction. 
70. In the public sector the validity of a provision in a contract depends upon 
whether it concerns a proper subject of collective bargaining. See Board of Educ. v. 
Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972); Koretz & 
Rabin, Labor Relations Law, 24 SYR. L. REV. 139 (1973). 
71. The duty to bargain on a subject does not require the public employer to 
surrender flexibility by writing a rigid rule into the agreement. As in the private 
sector, the public employer can bargain for a flexible rule or even for full discretion 
in regulating the subject during the contract period. See N.L.R.B. v. American Nat'l 
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
72. Collective bargaining on such matters as the content of the curriculum, the 
number of speech therapists, the choice of textbooks, and grading standards has been 
justified on the ground that teachers, as professionals, should have a greater voice 
in these decisions than politically sensitive lay boards of education and bureaucratic 
minded administrators, and that bargaining insulates decisionmaking from the pres- 
sures of the unenlightened populace. See Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public 
School Management, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1017 (1969). The assumption is that on all of 
these matters professional judgments should prevail over public choice. This assump- 
tion may be subject to question on several levels. See Goldstein, supra note 4. Un- 
doubtedly, there are decisions which should be left to professional judgment, but 
submitting them to collective bargaining is a clumsy, inadequate, and even dangerous 
way of achieving that. Bargaining is a political process responding to political forces 
and leaves teachers vulnerable on some matters which should be beyond reach of local 
majorities. 
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teachers' views can be summarized by a single voice, nor is there 
reason to believe that taxpayers, parents, or users of other services 
have any unified position. Two-sided bargaining on such issues mis- 
represents both the range of views and the alignment of interests 
which should be considered in making the decision. 
Furthermore, channeling discussion into closed bargaining sessions 
inhibits a full airing of viewpoints, for it precludes equal considera- 
tion of differing professional judgments of teachers and of differing 
judgments and concerns of parents, students, and other interested 
citizens. Even if all of these views are presented at the bargaining 
table, the decision is made by public representatives whose primary 
charge is to protect the public purse. Thus the decision is not made 
solely on the merits of the issue, but as part of a package which 
results from trading off unrelated items. Because of its structure and 
function, collective bargaining does not provide an appropriate po- 
litical process for making such decisions. 
To say that curriculum content is not a proper subject of bar- 
gaining does not mean that teachers have no legitimate interest in 
that subject or that they should not participate in curriculum de- 
cisions. It means only that the bargaining table is the wrong forum 
and the collective agreement is the wrong instrument. Because of 
the teachers' special interests and competence, the school board can 
properly be authorized, or even required, to consult with them be- 
fore making a decision. But no organization should purport to act 
as an exclusive representative; the discussions should not be closed; 
and the decision should not be bargained for or solidified as an 
agreement. In addition, all of the ordinary political processes should 
remain open for individuals or groups of teachers to make their views 
known to the politically responsible officials and thus to influence 
the decision.73 
This analysis, which restricts collective bargaining to subjects that 
substantially implicate budgetary issues, provides some guide for 
separating bargainable and nonbargainable subjects in the public 
sector. Yet it cannot provide a clear boundary line. 
If teachers demand reduction in class size or policemen demand 
73. A wide variety of procedures can be developed to ensure that teachers partici- 
pate in these decisions without depriving any interested group of an opportunity to 
be heard. Representatives of the union and other teacher groups can meet with the 
school board for full discussion of the problem. Committees can be elected by the 
affected teachers wholly outside the union framework. School faculties may discuss 
and make recommendations. And school boards can hold open public meetings at 
which teachers and their various spokesmen may present their views just as spokesmen 
for parents, students, and other groups do. 
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minimum manning of patrols, the interests of the employees may 
coincide with the interests of users of the particular service; the clear 
confrontation created by wage demands does not then exist. However, 
there remains the opposition of taxpayers and users of other services. 
Granting the union demands would almost certainly require in- 
creased appropriations for the schools or the police department. Even 
some parents may prefer that any increase in the school budget be 
spent to improve other aspects of the educational program. The con- 
figuration of political interest groups remains sufficiently similar to 
make the collective bargaining structure appropriate for resolving 
such issues. 
Collective bargaining might initially seem inappropriate for sub- 
jects such as seniority, promotions, work assignments, and discipline, 
which do not directly affect budget allocation. But union demands 
on these subjects are commonly resisted on the grounds that they 
reduce efficiency and efficiency is an interest shared by both taxpayers 
and users of public services. 
If the union's demands do not in fact affect efficiency, then the 
dispute is simply one between the employees in the bargaining unit 
and their supervisors, department heads, or personnel department. 
Such disputes do not involve the public's interest but rather concern 
the relative roles of opposing interest groups within the government 
in determining the terms and conditions of employment. These com- 
peting interests are represented at the two-sided bargaining table; 
the proper parties are on each side of the table. The structure and 
procedure seem quite appropriate for reconciling their interests and 
working out the rules to govern their relationships. 
Demands by policemen for disciplinary procedures which effec- 
tively foreclose use of a public review board further illustrate the 
need to examine each subject to determine whether it should be 
decided within the special political process of collective bargaining. 
In making such a demand the union probably represents the con- 
sensus of the employees and can thus properly speak with a single 
voice. However, such a demand has no identifiable budget cost; 
those interested in more police protection are more likely to sup- 
port than oppose the demand. Hence there is not the combined op- 
position which typified resolution of budgetary and level of service 
issues. Nor is there the opposition of supervisors which characterizes 
internal management and personnel issues, for the chief of police 
and the police commissioners who sit on the employer's side of the 
bargaining table find the prospect of a public review board equally 
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frightening. Those who favor a public review board are those who 
fear that policemen will act abusively or unlawfully and that their 
superiors will not take appropriate disciplinary action. The interests 
of this group are not represented at the bargaining table. Collective 
bargaining thus does not provide an appropriate political process 
for full discussion of the issue or for weighing and reconciling the 
competing interests. 
Again, the conclusion that this subject should be nonbargainable 
does not mean that policemen have no legitimate interest in whether 
their conduct should be subject to public review. They certainly have 
a right to participate in that decision, but only through the ordinary 
avenues of the political process which are equally open to all com- 
peting views and interest groups. 
D. Public Information and Discussion of Negotiations 
Collective bargaining in the public sector is an integral part of 
the political process, a procedure for reaching a political decision. 
Once agreement is reached at the bargaining table, many of the 
issues are largely foreclosed; a heavy presumption arises against re- 
jection of the agreement, even on budgetary grounds. The political 
officials can be held responsible at the polls, but without some 
knowledge of the positions of the parties at the bargaining table the 
voter is handicapped in making a judgment. For the political process 
to be responsive and reliable, members of the public need to know 
the issues being negotiated and have an opportunity to make their 
views known before agreement is reached. 
This proposition seems, at first glance, to run counter to the cus- 
tomary wisdom drawn from the private sector-that negotiations are 
best conducted in private. But moderate publicity need not disrupt 
the bargaining process. The public's need to know and to be able 
to make its views known does not require that public employee 
bargaining be conducted in a goldfish bowl.74 Indeed, it does not 
require anything substantially different on the public employer's 
side than is widely accepted on the employees' side in both the 
74. "Right to Know" or "Sunshine" laws have been held not to require that 
negotiations be held in public. It is enough that (1) the negotiator, after having 
reached a tentative agreement, makes his report in a public meeting where there is 
full opportunity for airing of views, and (2) the recommendations are voted on in 
public. See Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972); Edwards, supra note 3, 
at 902; cf. Town of Stratford, BNA 1972 GOV'T EM'LOYEE REL. RFr. No. 461, at B-l 
(Conn. L.R.B. 1972); City of Salem, BNA 1973 GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 485, at B-5 
(Mass. L.R.B. 1973). 
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public and private sector. Union members regularly recommend de- 
mands to be made in negotiations and normally vote on the union's 
proposals. During bargaining the union committee commonly reports 
to the members on the course of negotiation and often obtains fur- 
ther guidance, either formally or informally, as to which demands 
should have priority and which should be compromised. When a 
tentative agreement is reached, it is reported back to the members 
for vote. The outcome of that vote depends greatly on the effective- 
ness of communication between the union members and the nego- 
tiating committee during the course of negotiations. There would 
seem to be no compelling reason why members of the public ought 
not be kept as fully informed about what their representatives are 
doing. Collective bargaining can surely be democratized on both sides 
of the bargaining table.75 
A closely related problem arises when a minority union attempts 
to present its views concerning negotiations. For example, if a mi- 
nority teachers' representative appears at a public meeting of the 
school board to protest an agency shop clause proposed by the ma- 
jority union, should it be considered a violation of the duty to bar- 
gain exclusively with the majority union for the board to listen 
to the minority union's protest?76 The principle of exclusive rep- 
resentation prohibits an employer from bargaining with any em- 
ployee representative other than the majority union. In the private 
sector even listening to the minority representative might be viewed 
as undermining the majority union's status. But public sector bar- 
gaining is part of the governmental process and the responsible po- 
litical officials are entitled, if not obligated, to listen to the views 
of all those who have an interest in the decision. Listening to the 
75. Proposals have been made that proposed collective agreements be submitted to 
public referendum. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 2, at 200-01; Nigro, Collec- 
tive Bargaining: A Reappraisal, 32 PUB. AD. REV. 120 (1972). Such proposals overlook 
the practical problem of voting on three to 30 contracts each year and the more 
serious consequence of disintegrating decisionmaking on the employer side. It is a 
bit much to expect every voter to evaluate every agreement separately. In many 
school districts and some cities the voter already has a general veto because of the 
necessity to get approval of the tax rate by referendum. He ought not to be expected 
to vote on more fragmented issues. 
76. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board held that it would. Madison 
Teachers, Inc. v. Joint School Dist. No. 8, BNA 1972 GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 482, 
at B-3 (Wis. E.R.B. 1972). This was after the Board's ruling that refusal by the school 
board to let the minority representative speak would be a violation of employee rights 
tinder the statute had been reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. That court held 
that to allow the minority representative to speak would constitute negotiation with 
the minority union in violation of the statute. Milwaukee Teachers Local 252 v. 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969). See 
Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in Public 
Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1970). 
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views of the spokesman for a group of employees does not constitute 
bargaining, for it gives that spokesman no different status or access 
to the political process than any other citizen. It does not reduce 
the advantages which the majority union obtains by access to the 
special structure and procedure of collective bargaining.77 At most, 
it reduces the majority union's ability to conceal the fact that the 
employees do not unanimously support its position on every demand. 
Exclusive recognition has never, in law or in fact, guaranteed the 
majority union any such right to conceal. The establishment of col- 
lective bargaining in the public sector, as a method of governmental 
decisionmaking should certainly not have the effect of obstructing 
public disclosure of facts and views relevant to the political decision 
to be made. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article has been to articulate the premise that 
public employee bargaining is a method of governmental decision- 
making and should therefore be viewed as an integral part of the 
political process. In order to elaborate that premise and to explore 
some of its implications, it has been necessary to oversimplify the 
political process and the pressures which produce a decision. This 
is particularly true of the budget-making process, which is functionally 
the most important policy-making process of local government, but 
which is largely disguised as a colorless accounting exercise. 
Because the purpose here has been to present a framework which 
might provide a different perspective, rather than to undertake a 
precise analysis resulting in exact answers, the premise has been 
elaborated and extended with deliberate single-mindedness. Other 
considerations which might qualify this premise have, for the mo- 
ment, been pushed aside so as to make plain some of the projections 
of the political perspective. Only in this way can we determine whether 
the political perspective can be useful in helping us understand the 
problems of public employee bargaining. 
However valid the political perspective may be, the view it offers 
is troubling, for it makes us see that the wages and working con- 
77. The fundamental difference, both practically and legally, between collective bar- 
gaining and consulting or conferring has been emphasized by public employees, legis- 
latures, courts, and legal scholars. See Board of Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ. Ass'n, 17 
Ariz. App. 504, 498 P.2d 578 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 109 Ariz. 342, 509 P.2d 
612 (1973); Edwards, supra note 3, at 895-99; Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in 
California: The Meyers-Willis-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 719 (1972). 
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ditions of public employees depend upon the play of political forces 
which are often influenced by random and irrelevant considerations. 
It forces us to perceive also that fair but not overly generous treat- 
ment for employees depends upon devising arrangements which 
achieve a rough balance of political forces. Because of the unpre- 
dictability of the political process, one would instinctively like to re- 
move this decisionmaking from the political arena entirely, to have the 
decision made objectively on the basis of what is fair and reasonable. 
But the only escape from the political process is to put the de- 
cision in the hands of someone who is not answerable to the em- 
ployees, the taxpayers, or the users of public services. This may con- 
ceivably be done for limited groups of employees on limited occa- 
sions, but the authority to fix the terms of public employment and 
thus to bind the budget cannot be generally withdrawn from the 
political process. At most such "delegation" can rearrange the po- 
litical forces or give control to a political process outside the local 
community. Indeed, when arbitration is in general use, there is merely 
a restructuring of decisionmaking with the crucial political decision 
being the selection of the arbitrator, based on his past performance. 
The arbitrator, however, is likely to be less responsible to his con- 
stituency because his defined role is to be objective and his award is 
disguised as nonpolitical. 
The choice is not whether public employees' wages and other con- 
ditions of employment are to be decided through the political process, 
but how that process should be structured to make the decision. Col- 
lective bargaining provides a structure and procedure which gen- 
erally reflects the political forces involved. It places across the bar- 
gaining table the representatives of opposing interest groups con- 
cerned with budget allocations. It provides a forum for rational dis- 
cussion and accommodation of competing interests. The agreement 
reached provides a period of political stability on the issues settled. 
Overall, collective bargaining will more likely produce fair and re- 
sponsible results than the other alternatives. The task is to construct 
not only collective bargaining but also the other governmental in- 
stitutions and procedures so as to make them all fit together as an 
integrated political process. 
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